Principal-agent relationship has attracted the attentions of scholars from
different fields for over three decades. The area continues to be the interest of
research-scholars such that the EBSCO database lists 64 articles in
refereed journals between 2006 and 2008. This field focuses on economics,
socio-psychology and management largely. Such interest initially leads to the
birth of two streams of thoughts: Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Analysis
(TCA). Both these streams essentially deal with the control methods that the
principal can use over the agent. Agency Theory approaches the issue
through incentivization (Eisenhardt, 1989) and TCA deals with it focusing on
the relationship-structure and contract for better control. Whichever approach
one adopts, there is a limit to the principal's ability in documentation and
monitoring of preferred behavior by the agent. Somewhere down the line, the principal
has to let go of the control and start reducing monitoring efforts owing to
either infeasibility or exorbitant cost of such efforts. The final choice of the degree
of control and monitoring efforts depends greatly on the degree of comfort
the principal feels vis-a-vis the agent or simply, the
`trust'. A principal may trust an agent either due to the latter's ability to carry out the task as
desired (competence trust) or due to the perception that the latter will not act in a
manner detrimental to the relationship or the former (goodwill trust). Scholars
consider these two types of trust separatelyas though they were
differentwithout explicitly stating anything about their relationship (Morgan and Hunt,
1994; Hosmer, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996; Johnson, 1999; Das and Teng, 2001;
McKnight and Chervany, 2001). This paper examines the relationship, if any, between
two such seemingly independent types of trust: `competence trust' and
`goodwill trust'.
This paper starts with a scanning of research literature on trust for
its definition, attributes and bases. It traces the typologies of trust used by
various scholars and arrives at the oft-cited dichotomy of goodwill trust and
competence trust, examining their respective components. Thus, it derives the
hypotheses about their independence and explains the methodology used for testing
the hypotheses. The findings are explained and the possible reasons are
examined. The paper concludes with the implications to management-practice and
possible future research-directions. |