Corporate earnings management is one of
the most frequently investigated issues in the financial
management and accounting disciplines. Earnings management
has been widely used in many corporate issues for explaining
the impact on management's motivations to manipulate reported
earnings. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial
reports either to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. They
classify the motivation of earnings management into three
categories: (a) capital market expectations and valuation,
(b) contracts that are written in terms of accounting numbers,
and (c) antitrust or other government regulation. Based
on the three motivations, earnings management has been
the incentive to react on the impact of corporate events
such as initial public offerings (Aharony et al.,
1993; and Teoh et al., 1998); seasoned equity
offerings (Rangan, 1998; and Teoh et al., 1998),
management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams,
1994; and Wu, 1997), takeovers (Christie and Zimmerman,
1994). Earnings management in the capital offering process
is of particular concern because of the extent of information
asymmetry between the owners-managers and investors (Leland
and Pyle, 1977), and between informed and uninformed investors
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986). The information asymmetry between
the management and related parties creates an opportunity
for the management to engage in earnings management.
The process, pricing and stock market
response to seasoned offerings of capital, and their long-term
operating performance have been analyzed by several studies
for corporate sector worldwide. Studies on the financial
performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) of the
US companies suggest that SEO firms outperform in the pre-offer
period and underperforms post-offer. An analysis of stock
market performance reveals that offering firms outperform
the market before the issue, but that the market responds
negatively to the SEO announcement and returns continue
to underperform the market in the long run. To explain
these facts, Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998)
suggest that companies overstate their earnings before
an SEO using income-increasing accounting accruals. |