Where, how and at what sociopolitical, economic and geopolitical cost, do we generate a deficit-and-crisis-free quality power? This is the issue, which needs to be addressed while debating over the eventual import of civilian nuclear power. We have neglected the power sector for too long. Had we given coal its due importance even two decades back, India today would have been in a far better position of bargaining in respect of civilian nuclear power import. In view of the problems associated with carbon emission, fly ash disposal, massive requirement of water we, however, cannot solely rely on what we have most, coal. We hardly have natural gas for power generation. Hydroelectricity on an excessive scale in Himalayas can irreversibly damage the environment with serious socio-economic and consequently, political implications. Therefore, India also needs an energy mix and 5-10% contribution from nuclear sector, which could possibly be the right choice. Even at that level, because of the limitations imposed by nuclear waste disposal, we would possibly be forced to restrict our generation through imported technology to not more than 40,000 MW. That might somehow `manage' the situation for the next couple of decades. What after that?

Access to energy is one of the crucial parameters determining the growth of a nation. India is no exception. India's power generation capacity has increased from 1,363 MW in 1947 to 1,43,311 MW in April 2008. Yet, 50-60% of Indian households still depend on traditional biomass based sources of energy for meeting their daily requirement. Most of these households have no electricity, because they cannot afford to buy it. The country experiences up to 30% region and season dependent power shortage in the peak hours, all India average being about 15%. In view of the current economic growth rate of around 9% and billion plus population, even if we attain the targeted generating capacity of 200,000 MW in 2012, which is doubtful, there still might be 15-20% power shortage in the peak hours. Besides, power produced in India is inconsistent in quality. Therefore, where, how and at what sociopolitical, economic and geopolitical cost, we do generate a deficit-and-crisis-free quality power? This is the issue which needs to be addressed first, while debating over the Indo-US or any other nuclear deal.

For various reasons, unit power generation cost in India, whether dependent or independent of generation route, varies substantially. It is rather difficult to get an average `country level' reliable estimate of that cost. Therefore, the data presented in Table 1 should be treated as broad guidelines only. According to TNSEB data for 2003-04, the typical wind power generation cost was Rs. 3.01 per kWh. There are a number of Small Hydroelectric Plants (SHP), where generation cost is up to three times the upper limit of Rs. 11.48, the cost being higher for mini and micro hydroelectric plants. Further, hydroelectricity in general is not available round the year; and outside the Himalayan belt also, it is available only for a limited period in a year.

Power Paradox of India, Nuclear Power Technology, Small Hydroelectric Plants, SHP, Sociopolitical cost, Geopolitical cost, Civilian nuclear power, Integrated Energy Policy, IEP, Electricity Supply Commission, ESCOM, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Opencast Mines.