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Among the reasons for the failure of bank management models amply highlighted by the
effects of the economic crisis and partly facilitated by the regulations imposed by the banking
supervisors, there is also the lack of an integrated and overall approach to banking activities
capable of simultaneously assessing the fallout of any choices made on different risk domains.
An example of this situation comes from the securitization processes that have often led
to looser credit risk assessment methods due to the assumption of a transfer to the market of
loans and the postponement to a subsequent measurement by the rating agencies. In addition,
the fact of holding sizable ‘tranches’ of bonds deriving from these processes, i.e., of investing
in securities of separate operations, has been discussed more often in terms of their market
risk profile, neglecting the related credit risk, although this becomes fundamental in
determining the value, for instance, of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) and Asset-
Backed Securities (ABS). The inclusion of these instruments in the sole trading book represents
an example of such policies.
Much the same can be said about the liquidity risk. While banks are naturally liable to
this risk, the availability of an enormous mass of funds, low interest rates and apparently ever
more efficient markets have led to its underestimation and to an exposure that has gradually
grown as the crisis has become more severe (BCBS, 2010). With an increasing
internationalization of the financial system and a rising pressure of competition, every
intermediary had been obliged to seek a delicate equilibrium between a prudent and balanced
term structure of the assets and liabilities while pursuing higher and higher levels of
profitability. The result has been very different at different levels of exposure to the liquidity
risk (Tarantola, 2008).
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