Contemporary Israel and Iran comprise the two most evidently antagonistic nations in the world, sharing a particularly pronounced confrontational relationship. However, prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran and Israel were allies who cooperated extensively with one another, recognized their shared interests and developed informal relations and security alliances. The connect between the two nations was deeper than geopolitics. It could be traced back to the depths of Jewish and Persian history. Following the revolution and Iran’s embrace of a more radical ideology along with a recalculation of its national interests, Iran and Israel came to be viewed as ideological and political opposites. This resulted in a deterioration of the two states’ previously close, albeit informal relationship to the present state of affairs. The animosity between the two former allies was often represented as a clash of civilizations: a supposedly secular western democracy against a backward, theological authoritarian regime. Yet, in reality there were remarkable similarities in their geopolitical strategy, national and religious ideology and domestic social psychology. A more inclusive understanding of the relationship between these two states is therefore imperative to evaluate the current state of Iranian and Israeli relations, as well as the Israeli threat perceptions of the Iranian regime. While many in Israel today, including the current political dispensation, consider Iran to be an ancient enemy and an existential threat, yet, given the two states’ history of interfaces there are future scenarios that could provide a catalyst for improving relations between Iran and Israel, which in turn could have profound implications for the region at large.

The defeat of Iraq in 1991 along with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, have moved Israel and Iran towards greater competition. The ideological framing of this conflict has reached new levels, reinforcing the strategic basis of the rivalry. Iran’s quest for a nuclear program and potentially a nuclear weapons capability has particularly intensified tensions between the two nations. In the current regional environment, where Iran has stepped up its anti-Israel rhetoric and is asserting its interest in areas that border Israel, each country now views the other as a central security challenge. The 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, which was widely perceived as a proxy war between Israel and Iran, has often been regarded as an indication of the future and possibly more direct conflict between the two countries. Many Israeli and US analysts view the Arab uprisings of 2011 through the prism of Iran, worrying that the fall of pro-US leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and the widespread protests among Shia majority populations in the countries such as Bahrain, will only strengthen Iran’s hand and tilt the balance of power in its favor.1 Israeli analysts apprehend about Iran capitalizing on the unrest in the Arab world to assert its own influence and point to such developments as the passing of two Iranian ships through the Suez Canal to illustrate such apprehensions.2 Israeli concerns over Iran’s nuclear program are also likely to rise if they perceive the uprisings in the Arab world as distracting international efforts to keep the pressure on Iran. In many ways, the Arab uprisings have actually created new challenges for Iran domestically and may make its broader regional appeal in the Arab world more difficult, as it no longer holds a monopoly on popular anti-Israel positions.3 Yet, these narratives suggesting that Iran will capitalize on the regional turmoil to advance its rejectionist regional agenda, underscore the extent to which many Western and Israeli analyses continue to view Iran as the region’s central security challenge.4 For Israel, Iran’s perceived rising influence is particularly alarming in that it is reaching Israel’s borders in Lebanon and Gaza through its political and military support to Hizballah and Hamas. Israel also worries that Iran’s influence will only grow and Israel’s manoeuvrability will decrease if Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability. Although Israelis debate the value of using the ‘existential threat’ terminology because of concern that such language may erode Israel’s deterrence posture, many in Israel’s security establishment nonetheless believe that future Iranian nuclear use is possible, either by design or during a crisis that escalates beyond the original intentions of leaders on either side. Iran, for its part, also increasingly views Israel as a geopolitical and military rival, which uses its close relationship with the US to challenge Iran’s ambitions in the Middle East. Iran’s national security policies, especially its relations with regional allies such as Hizballah and Syria, and the development of its military doctrine and industry, are now greatly shaped by this perception of Israel. With Israel as the only regional state considering military action against Iran as its nuclear efforts move forward, the rivalry between Israel and Iran has emerged as a defining feature of the current regional environment. Despite the significance of this issue and its effect on regional stability, there are surprisingly few detailed studies examining Israeli and Iranian attitudes and postures toward one another outside the context of US Iranian relations, barring exceptions such as Trita Parsi.

International Relations Journal, Iran, Israel, Construing, Past, Envisaging, Future, The Iranian Revolution, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), ‘Occupied territories’.