Tensions between China and Japan have flared up recently after China asserted
its rights over Senkaku Islands, a disputed archipelago claimed and controlled
by Japan. Significantly, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe assured the
Diet that he was “willing to use physical force to repel any aggression.”
In an hour-long chat with Keqiang before the dinner and at official meetings after
that, a usually reticent Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister, sought to use the
April 15, 2013 Chinese ingress of 19 km into eastern Ladakh’s Daulti Beg Oldi sector
to draw a red line on border incursions, saying that peace and tranquility is the
‘foundation’ of Indo-China relationship and must be maintained. Singh reportedly
said that while there are well-established mechanisms to deal with a situation like
this, in this particular instance it had taken an unusually long time to resolve the
problem.1
The foreign policy of China towards India has been principally directed and guided
by the objective of striking India’s power position in the Asian continent and active
participation in world affairs. In a speech laced with symbolism and strategic intent
in equal measure, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a pitch for greater defense,
security, political and economic ties with Japan. Singh hailed Japan as a “natural
and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast region in
Asia that is surrounded by the Pacific and Indian Ocean.”2 Singh’s vision for the
region, where the obvious concern is an assertive China, came at an address to
Japan-India Association, Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League and
International Friendship Exchange Council in Tokyo. He used similar expressions while
addressing business leaders earlier. Singh recalled Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe’s speech to Indian Parliament in August 2007 where he talked of “confluence
of the seas.”3 Abe, an ardent advocate of India-Japan ties, is known for his strong
views on China.
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