There are many small, medium and large companies listed on any given stock exchange. Each
of these companies may have millions of shareholders which may each own relatively few
shares. In percentage terms, their individual holdings are insignificant as to play any meaningful
role in the working of the company. On the other hand, many of these public limited companies
may have sizeable share blocks that are owned by the promoters and other non-promoter
block holders in the form of institutional investors such as corporates, brokerage houses,
mutual funds, pension funds, and private equity investors, etc., who often play an important
role in the corporate governance of such companies. Small shareholders are the focus of the
corporate governance system, with strong regulations often designed to protect their interests
over those of large shareholders. Therefore in such a system a great deal of disclosure of
corporate information is normally required by the law.
Outside block shareholders may be efficiently able to monitor the management of such
companies and may also contribute by rendering expert advice leading to a reduction in agency problems between shareholders and managers. Reducing agency problems can lead to
an increase in firm value as reflected by an increase in stock price. While phenomenal research
work in the west has been concentrated in the area of corporate ownership and control, the
developing economies have seen very less research in this area. The behavior of stock prices
around large transfer of shares is of paramount importance for the market regulators on the
one hand and for large institutional investors on the other. Market regulators are concerned
with overseeing the fairness in transactions, ensuring liquidity and safeguarding the interests
of investors particularly the smaller ones. Large institutional investors are concerned about
the impact costs involved in undertaking large trades.
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