The state structuration in Afghanistan began with the ethnopolitical portioning of the state. This had intrinsic limitation as the common Afghan would only see state coming through particularistic arrangements conveyed through traditional authority. The secular institutions such as bureaucracy, law and civil society had disadvantage in this setup. The provincial governance showed better resilience to such ethnopolitical structure and at the same time National legislature too strived for more powers that could lend credence to secular institutions in Afghanistan. The role of democracy in promotion of such cause was only partially successful as the majoritarian power often slipped into the dominance of Pashtun warlords that carried a sense of distrust due to the superimposition of Taliban identity in their geocultural realms. Therefore, it depended a lot on leaders to make a careful choice between limited democracy and limited ethnocracy. The minority in Afghanistan took up the cause of secular institutions as they were the larger guarantee of their inclusion in power sharing. But the majoritarian leadership has often bargained outside the institutional framework that can be seen as consociational arrangement effectively weakening the secular institutionalization. This paper looks into the power sharing arrangement between Pashtun and non- Pashtun groups within the fiduciary limits of ethnofederalism and ethnogeopolitics that have shaped the evolution of Afghan state post 9/11.

The Bonn agreement has proved to be a reckoning case of mutant ethnic conflict that simply refused to subside given the internal-external connection of groups; the sources of power resided outside the state territory. The law remained in the hands of warlords who were connected to their kinsmen beyond state territory often stressing the borders that has prevented the Afghan state from having peaceful coexistence with neighbors. This tricky situation had much contribution from the Cold War geopolitics, which created microstructures of contested spaces along margins of tribal and kinship groups. The role of technology in making these rivalries count in the stratagem of great powers paved way for the threatening scenario where even the smallest and remotest act of an individual would construe the perception of threat. And, therefore, the war which started as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) finally narrowed down to signature pointing and personality strikes even after a decade.1 This has had much to do with the role of leadership who are the mobilizer of threat. The important variable that got into play with signature strikes were the sections of tribal groups represented by personality and their following. The extended kinship network and loyalty have been the foremost qualification to be a successful warlord apart from small arms and drugs. These drone strikes have particularly riled the Pashtun tribal communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which generated myriad reactions such as one leading to incendiary green on blue attacks.

International Relations Journal, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Ethnofederalism, Ethnogeopolitics, Afghan State.