The Government of India on May 23, 2017 prohibited the sale and purchase of the animals at marketplace for slaughtering purposes. It aims to decelerate the tendency to produce 'unproductive' animals for killing in slaughterhouses. Certainly, killing of cattle produces some benefits but at a costlier price in terms of cruelty to the animal concerned. The society has spent much resource on the animal from its birth up to production age. Yet, it will be wrong if we are not taking into account the social cost at the time of profit calculation. A prominent consideration in this regard is the unnecessary deviation from a well-thought constitutional goal. This paper attempts to explore legal implications and analyzes the instant profit and loss resulting from ban on the sale and purchase of animals for slaughtering purposes and its diverse and distinct aspects in the national context. The Madras High Court has stayed the enforcement of the notification. The Supreme Court extended the stay to the rest of India. Though the matter is sub judice, there is space for the intelligentsia to discuss it in the light of settled law by the Courts. Taking these into consideration, the present study tries to comment on the effort made by the Central Government.

The paper seeks to re-incorporate the utilitarian adoption of the color blind vision in the system of reservation in India that has been clouded by the adoption of the Rawlsian perception of practical equality. The Constituent Assembly debates have shown that the inclusion of Article 16 (4)1 in the Indian Constitution, and consequently Article 15 (4),2 were to serve as exceptions to the formal equality embedded in Articles 14,3 15(1),4 16(1),5 and 16 (2).6 Given the structural conditions in India, a concurrence with the conception of practical equality flows as an absolute necessity. However, the necessity must not supersede the general/formal equality established in the society. The first part of the paper analyzes statutory interpretations guided by the principle of reasonableness to prove that it is a product of a Color Blind Constitution. The second part establishes the greater prominence to formal equality under the Color Blind Indian Constitution. The third part illustrates that the Group Subordination Vision under the Indian Constitution came about at a compromise to the sacred balance, by an equality of deceit. The fourth part claims for the adoption of economic criteria for backwardness and the 'creamy layer'. The fifth part seeks to reconcile all the aforementioned ideas to re-establish the sacred balance. The analysis is restricted to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes.

All legal systems-whether unitary or plural-must conform to the international standards of human rights, including gender equality. Muslim personal law legitimizes traditional practices in the name of religion that are inconsistent with expansion of freedom and gender equality. The practical importance of this paper arises from the fact that, despite formal guarantees of equality of rights at both the international and national levels, lives of Muslim women in India continue to be characterized by gender discrimination and substantive inequality in the field of family law. It is interesting to observe that progressive men and women belonging to the Muslim community have already started demanding a change. It is well-known that many Muslim countries have made substantial changes in their personal laws. The changes taking place in other countries which are predominantly Muslim can make an impact on Muslim opinion in this country. If the reform is to be given content and to be meaningful in the lives of Muslim women, it cannot simply be imposed by legal structures external to the community, but must be introduced from within the community, and must begin with socioeconomic and educational empowerment of both men and women of that community.