In February 2005, the Central Government came out with a detailed tariff policy. This is basically an extension of the Electricity Act 2003. The importance of this policy cannot be overestimated in view of the fact that this is the first concrete step towards getting micro-policies right. There is no real point in drafting a macro-policy and leaving the players to figure out the details, especially in infrastructure. This can lead to untold problems.
Balancing
the requirements of getting a reasonable return for the
investor (and thus attracting funds for the sector), and
at the same time ensuring reasonable user charges for the
consumers, is a critical issue for regulators, particularly
in a country such as India, where users either cannot pay
or refuse to pay. There also needs to be some sort of consistency
as power is being drawn from grids across the country. Indeed,
the final aim is to create an integrated grid network across
the country, with private players having an equal access
to the same. The return on equity has been looked at, subject to
certain debt-equity ratios, so that the base of equity
is neither too low nor high. Without commenting on the
appropriateness of the same, the very fact that such
a ratio has been firmed up, would imply that some thought
has gone into the issue of balancing debt with equity.
Too much debt raises the interest costs and insistence
on too much equity means that the risk capital issue
becomes a matter of concern for the investor. Anything
between 1.5:1 to 2:1 for a reasonable level of tariffs
could be considered as something that the country could
live with.
The encouragement of captive power plants is a positive
factor and would keep the state units on their toes.
It has, however, been the constant complaint of the
state units that they have to provide power at subsidized
rates to domestic and rural consumers whilst the IPPs
and captive power units target the large industrial
units. A lot of thought seems to have been given to
transmission loss allocation, and certain benchmarks
and standards have been laid down. Everyone is aware
that this is where the maximum controllable losses take
place, and not in generation. There is plenty of collusion
between the various electricity boards and influential
consumers regarding theft of power, mainly for industrial
and agricultural purposes. The implementation of certain
financial incentives and disincentives should at least
put a check on these activities as various payouts and
fines bring these matters sharply to the notice of the
higher authorities in a manner that mere formal reporting
does not. |