This study makes a comprehensive analysis of the British imperial railways during the second half of the 19^th century. Aspects such as the development of colonial economy, the role of finance capital, comparative spread effect, British monopoly and colonization of Indian economy, labor on the railway projects, colonial forestry, famine and disease, etc., are dealt at some length in this paper. The massive predatory and exploitative nature of imperial railway project under the facade of Britain's benevolence to the backward people of India could not have been further from the reality of the material condition of masses under colonial hegemony.

In 1846, the revenue commissioner of Bombay, Thomas Williamson wrote to the Chairman of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company in London stating that "The great trunk-line, running by the Malseje Ghaut in the direction of Nagpur, would be most direct which could possibly be selected to connect Bombay to Calcutta. Commercially, it would be best for the cotton of Berar, while for the first 120 miles from Bombay we would proceed in the immediate direction of the military stations of Ahmednagar, Jaulna and Aurangabad." Nothing could be more obvious than the twin purpose of colonial railways stated so early and so clearly above, i.e., commercial and military. These two objectives set the tone for the imperial railway project until the end of the British Raj. Four years later the same company undertook the construction of the very first 20-24 miles railway line from Bombay to Thana, completed and opened in April 1853. By 1900, over 24,000 miles of tracks had been laid. This enormous project was financed entirely by British private investment capital.

Private British companies with the strong backing of the government of India not only built but also owned these railways. There were on average 1,405 miles under construction every year until the end of the century. Some £150 mn was invested in Indian railways by the end of the 19^th century. This became the single largest investment in the British Empire. Government of India became the guarantor to the railway shareholders who were mostly British. Private companies would build and operate their respective lines in different regions of the subcontinent with a guaranteed 5% return on their stockholders' investment assured by the Indian revenues of the empire. And between 1869 and early 1880s, the government of India itself built railroads for private British companies. From Indian revenues, £50 mn was set aside by the colonial state to meet the guarantee irrespective of the company's losses.

The `guarantee system' promised its shareholders that if the companies performed poorly, the taxpayers of India would pay for the loss. Thus the entire profit went to the railway companies and their English shareholders while the loss was borne by the Indian people. Simply put, this was a `heads-I-win, tails-you-loose proposition.' The deployment of British capital in such a manner was an example of `private investment at public risk.' By 1870s, the outflow of interest actually exceeded the inflow of fresh capital into India. And by the end of the 19^th century, the total cost of the Indian railways amounted to £350 mn, the largest outlet for the export of British capital.

History and Culture Journal, Imperial Railways, Political Economy, Indian Economy, Indian railways, British Companies, Colonial Railway Projects, Railway Capital Markets, British Industry, International Trade, Indian Colonial Economy, Ecological Transformations.