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                     Several studies of Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958) examined the reasons for 
                          economists' focussed attention on the appropriate choice of debt and equity. 
                          Consequently, numerous theories emerged based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input 
                          market interactions, corporate control consideration, and taxes. These 
                          theories, while validating the central message of MM that optimality of capital structure is an issue inextricably linked 
                          to taxes or some specifically identified market imperfections, however, 
                          failed to provide a definitive answer to optimal capital structure choice (that would maximize firm value) in the presence 
                    of market imperfections.  
                    Barclay and Smith (1999) suggest that most competing theories of optimal capital 
                      structure are not mutually exclusive. 
                      Consequently, it may not be possible to reject any theory in favor 
                      of another, as there exists a possibility of more than one of them being right at the same time. 
                      Also noteworthy is the fact that many of the variables that affect capital structure choice are 
                      often difficult to measure; for example, the variable `growth' has been represented in empirical 
                      studies through growth of assets, growth in sales, 
                      market-to-book ratio or growth in capital 
                      employed. Which of them is the closest proxy for growth is a debatable 
                      issue, and selecting one among them as an independent variable in a regression model in terms of 
                  goodness-of-fit criteria might result in biasing the interpretation of the significance levels of the tests.   |