In December 2005, the "Chetak" scooter, the enduring workhorse
of Bajaj Auto Limited was finally laid to rest when the company stopped
its production. For more than three decades, it had ruled the
two-wheeler market in India, and enabled Bajaj Auto to enjoy market share in
excess of 75% and rise to become the world's largest scooter
manufacturer. Hamara Bajaj (Our Bajaj) was
truly the Indian family vehicle of the seventies and eighties, so that Bajaj
Auto could, with a degree of credibility, lay claim to the advertising
tagline: "The grand picture of a resurgent India"
(Buland Bharat ki Buland Tasveer). By the turn of the
century (1999-2000) however, the "shadow of decline", to quote Levitt, was
beginning to show. Bajaj lost its position as the world's largest
scooter manufacturer; and by 2009, the company had withdrawn from it
staple product, the scooter. Now, in
2010, it has initiated a major brand makeover, including a move to
drop the Bajaj brand name from its products
altogether. Ironically, the company's stock price has
appreciated considerably. How could such an iconic brand suffer such major decline? To find
an answer, this case study analyzes the factors that led to this
circumstance in the light of established strategic frameworks.
Chandler (1962), based on his classic studies of major US
corporations, stated that "structure follows
strategy," i.e., changes in corporate strategy lead to changes in
organizational structure. He also concluded that
as organizations grow, they transform from one structural make-up to
another as they expand. These changes happen because the old
structure, having been stretched to its limit, causes inefficiencies detrimental
to the functioning of the organization and therefore needs to be addressed.
While analyzing the factors that led to the decline of General
Motors, The Economist wrote: "GM's
architect, Alfred Sloan, never had Henry Ford's entrepreneurial or
technical genius, but he had organization. He designed his company around
the needs of his customers (a car for every purse and purpose). The
divisional structure he created in the 1920s, with professional
managers reporting to a head office through strict financial monitoring,
was adopted by other titans of American business, such as GE, DuPont
and IBM before the model spread across the rich world. Although this
model was brilliantly designed for domination, when the environment
changed, it proved disastrously inflexible. The problem in the 1970s was not
really the arrival of better, smaller, lighter Japanese cars; it was GM's failure
to respond in kind. Rather than hitting back with superior products,
the company hid behind politicians who appeared to help it in the short
term. Rules on fuel economy distorted the market because they had a
loophole for pickups and other light trucks - a sop to farmers and tool-toting
artisans. The American carmakers exploited that by producing
squadrons of SUVs, while the government restricted the import of small,
efficient Japanese cars. If Detroit had spent less time lobbying for
government protection and more on improving its products it might have fared
better. Sensible fuel taxes would have hurt for a while, but unlike
market-distorting fuel-efficiency rules, they would have forced GM to
evolve." |