So-called `Safety Bucks' schemes attempt to reduce worker injury claims by offering cash rewards to the work force when weeks pass without injury. But safety bucks can turn the decision to claim injury into a game theoretic problem pitting workers on the factory floor against each other. What management sees as a way to reduce frivolous injury claims may be a bet on toxic relations in the workplace.

A recent New York Times article reported that systems intend to reduce worker injury claims by rewarding the workforce when weeks pass without injury. Rewards include cash or coupons that can be redeemed at local restaurants. The scheme is considered to be an innovative way for the management to reduce worker compensation costs by cutting down on false injury claims. But labor's response to the system has been mixed. Some report that they feel that they cannot report an injury because they will be ostracized by their peers. If this is the case, then the so called `safety bucks' work by pitting workers against each other instead of encouraging workers to be more cautious in order to avoid injury. Safety bucks create a conflict of interest between workers who are considering to call in injured and those who lose their safety reward as a result. Suddenly, it is no longer cost-free for labor to adopt an all-for-one and one-for-all attitude. Safety bucks can turn the decision to claim injury into a game theoretic problem with workers on the factory floor working against each other. What management sees as a way to reduce frivolous injury claims may be a bet on toxic relations in the workplace.

I present a simple game theoretic model of possible worker claim filing behavior and response to a peer's injury claim if safety bucks are involved. Sam is considering to file a claim. He knows whether his injury justifies the time taken off of work or not but his buddies at work do not know for sure. They can only trust that Sam is not exploiting the system robbing them of their safety bucks which are valued by all at B units of satisfaction. Knowledge that Sam is claiming a back ache to take a couple of days off to hang out with his new girlfriend, would anger his peers and lead to some form of retribution because the value associated to ostracizing Sam in this case exceeds the value of supporting him in his decision. More precisely, ostracizing Sam if he is perceived as a cheater, willing to jeopardize safety rewards to claim compensation for a benign or non-existent injury, is worth O^b. Supporting Sam because he is one of the buddies, even if his injury is benign is worth S^b. Supporting one's buddies is a show of solidarity and camaraderie that comes with the satisfaction of sticking together in the face of a management team that supervises without the risk of life or limb. But if Sam's injury is benign, O^b>S^b.

Effective Executive Magazine, Foster Toxic Work Relations, Rational Behavior, Toxic Work Environment, Safety Bucks, Safety Reward, Indirect Factor, Ffrivolous Injury Claims, Worker Compensation Costs.