There is a growing interest in the literature on herding behavior (Hirshleifer and
Teoh, 2003), contagion (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; and Uchida and Nakagawa, 2007) and
bubble phenomena (Shiller, 2002) of financial intermediaries and markets. In banking
literature, herding is often evoked as an anomaly, as a cause of economic behavior if other
explanations fail for banking crises (Reisen, 1999), bank runs (Samartín, 2003), credit crunches
(Pecchenino, 1998), currency crises (Lam, 2002), foreign currency lending (Tzanninis, 2005) and
with regards to the recent regulatory change, i.e., the Basel II Accord (Borio
et al., 2001). There is also a related stream of literature that concerns itself with issues in banking
regulation, financial market efficiency and growth (Levine, 2005; Haiss and Fink, 2006; and
Hirshleifer, 2008), however without taking herding effects into account. Rajan (2006) and
Llewellyn (2002) provide notable exceptions.
Building on Fink and Haiss (1999, 2002, 2003), and Haiss (2009), the goal of this
paper is twofold. For one, to provide a more coherent overview of herding in financial
services by integrating capital market and banking issues, and by establishing a crossover
from rational to behavioral herding. This will add to the general understanding of
financial services phenomena. For two, to show that regulation and the very
industry-specific aspects of the banking sector can become natural causes for herding under
specific circumstances, and that herding as unintended macro-side effect should receive
explicit treatment in regulatory change overs. Kane's (1981) framework of "regulatory
dialectic" is applied to explain the impact of regulation on the interaction between collective
bank behavior and the economy. As a well-functioning financial sector plays a major role
for financial intermediaries, and others engaged in the financial sector architecture
and beyond. Conceptually, the paper contributes by (1) defining a coherent model (termed
"bank herding funnel") and by (2) offering remedies for regulators and bank managers to
mitigate the herding triggers that surfaced in the current global financial crisis. |