The aim of this paper is to study the role of cheap talk in the determination of the focal point in a bargaining game. A general discussion was conducted before the bargaining, followed by a poll in which the players had to find a common solution to an abstract bargaining problem. Though the results were negative, it is concluded that knowing individual preferences may help in predicting the solutions towards which players will converge at least in a social setting and `understanding' the extent of satisfaction. These considerations refer to variables traditionally left out of economic analysis which focuses instead on the final payoff and not on their relation to preferences or satisfactionthat are deemed non-measurable. On the contrary, this work shows that consistent data emerge by simply asking players to express their preferences and satisfaction. This gives the authors the confidence to formulate new hypotheses aiming at uncovering and understanding individual behavior. Even if the results do not permit to draw strong final conclusions, they point out new possible answers, new ideas and topics for discussion.

Preferences, Choices and Satisfaction in a Bargaining Game, determination of the focal point, bargaining game, general discussion, individual preferences, social setting, economic analysis, individual behavior, conclusions.